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CHAPTER 3 
Article Two: Sales 
WILLIAM E. HOGAN 
§3.1. General. A major incentive of the entire Code project was 
a desire of various business groups for the modernization of the Uni-
form Sales Act, and the first years of effort were devoted to the 
drafting of the predecessors of the present Article 2, Sales.1 In many 
cases the Sales Article restates or clarifies the statement of the prior 
law; in some it furnishes criteria for deciding cases not previously 
covered by statute; and in others it rejects the old approach and de-
velops new methods of handling problems. The purpose of this chapter 
is to offer an introduction to the Code's new methodology and some 
of its substantive provisions in the light of Massachusetts law. One 
caution must be raised at the outset: an emphasis here upon novelty 
should not obscure the fact that the Code in large measure clarifies 
or restates existing law. 
§3.2. Offer-acceptance and the Statute of Frauds. The Uniform 
Sales Act has little to say about the formation of the contract between 
the seller and the buyer. The problems of offer and acceptance, con-
sideration, and modification have been lumped into the total mass 
of contract law.1 The Code departs from this notion and establishes 
some statutory criteria for the solution of these questions in the sale of 
goods area. For the most part the new rules are formulated upon the 
notion that the reasonable expectations of the parties in a commercial 
deal should be effectuated by the law. A not-so-hypothetical case may 
be useful in treating a representative problem under the Code.2 
A is trying to obtain a contract to furnish bus transportation for 
school children. Before bidding on the contract, A needs to ascertain 
WILLIAM E. HOGAN is Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
and is a member of the Massachusetts Bar. He was formerly Special Assistant to 
the Chief of the Armed Services Medical Procurement Agency. He participated in 
formulating the Massachusetts Annotations to the Uniform Commercial Code. 
§3.I. 1 Report of the Uniform Commercial Acts Section, Handbook of the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings 
89 (1940). 
§3.2. 1 General Laws, c. 106, §5, Uniform Sales Act (hereinafter cited "USA") 
§3. provides: "A contract ,to sell or a sale may be in writing, either with or without 
seal, or by word of mouth, or partly in writing and partly by word of mouth, or 
may be inferred from the conduct of the parties." 
2 Kuzmeskus v. Pickup Motor Co., Inc., 330 Mass. 490. 115 N.E.2d 461 (1953). 
1
Hogan: Chapter 3: Article Two: Sales
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1957
§3.2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: ART. 2 15 
the cost of performing. A contacts B, a dealer in buses, to determine 
the cost of obtaining five new buses which will be required under the 
transportation contract. B makes a written offer describing the vehicles 
and stating his price, closing with the statement "This is a firm offer 
and will remain open for sixty days." Within a week A, having care-
fully calculated his bid based on B's offer, is awarded the transportation 
contract. B telephones A the following day and withdraws his offer 
because of a price increase. A then insists on the prior offer and tells 
B it is accepted. 
Under the present law a lawyer consulted by A might think that 
since the offer by B was neither under seal nor supported by con-
sideration, it could not now ripen into a contract by A's acceptance. 
It was a revocable offer, revoked prior to acceptance. If A's lawyer 
were operating under the Code, he would find that Section 2-203 
eliminates the seal as a means of giving permanency to the offer in 
sales contracts. But in a Code jurisdiction, A's lawyer would have to 
consider Section 2-205.3 Here the inquiry is different. Is the offeror a 
merchant? Is the offer in a signed writing? Does it by its terms give 
assurance that it will be held open? Will the acceptance occur within 
the time stated or, if none is indicated, within a reasonable time? In 
any event will the acceptance occur within three months? If each of 
these questions is answered affirmatively, the offeree's power of accept-
ance is preserved. Thus freedom of contract is still maintained. The 
offeror is in full control of his offer but he takes the risk of giving 
written assurances that it will remain open. The time limit for accept-
ance is also within the offeror's control, but in no event may the 
period of irrevocability exceed three months. 
Finally, the offeror must be a professional, that is, a "merchant." 
Here is another new concept of the Code, that there should be different 
rules of law governing the conduct of the professional. This notion 
deserves special treatment and we shall return it to frequently. Sec-
tion 2-104 defines the term "merchant" in language not unlike the 
concept of "dealer" in the present law relating to the warranty of 
merchantability.4 
Let us now reverse our hypothetical case. If B, the seller, had fur-
nished A, the buyer, with a printed order form containing a stipulation 
that the buyer's offer was to remain open for sixty days, would the 
3 Section 2-205 provides: "Firm Offers. An offer by a merchant to buy or sell 
goods in a signed writing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held 
open is not revocable, for lack of consideration, during the time stated or if no 
time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event may such period of irrevoca-
bility exceed three months; but any such term of assurance on a form supplied by 
the offeree must be separately signed by the offeror." 
4 Section 2-104 provides: "(I) 'Merchant' means a person who deals in goods 
of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge 
or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom 
such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker 
or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such 
knowledge or skilL" 
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seller have a power of acceptance for that period? It seems that the 
first inquiry would examine A's status as a merchant. Even then the 
Code protects unwary parties using printed forms supplied by the 
other party by insisting that in these cases the provision giving dura-
tion to the offer be separately signed. 
This is one inroad into the doctrine of consideration found in the 
Code's article dealing with sales. Another occurs in Section 2-209, deal-
ing with modification of contracts. Using our same hypothetical case, 
if A and B had entered into a binding contract for the purchase and 
sale of the five buses. what would be the effect of their later agreement 
that B would deduct $100 from the price of each bus. thereby passing 
on to A a price saving resulting from a break in the market price? Our 
current approach would call for an inquiry into the presence or ab-
sence of consideration supporting B's promise to accept the lower 
amount.1> Dropping the common law doctrine of consideration here. 
as in the case of firm offers. the Code depends upon the expectations 
of the parties to support its result. Two limitations are placed upon 
this kind of modification. First. the parties may provide in an original 
signed agreement that modification can only occur by another signed 
writing; this again protects the concept of freedom of agreement. Sec-
ond. if the agreement as modified is within the provision of the Statute 
of Frauds. it must be sufficiently memorialized to satisfy that provision. 
This leads to a consideration of the requirements of the Statute of 
Frauds under the Code.6 Under the Uniform Sales Act the provision 
dealing with the Statute of Frauds covers both transactions in goods 
and in choses in action in which the contract price is $500 or more.7 
The dollar limitation is retained in the Code. but the Sales Article 
contains no provisions for a Statute of Frauds for choses in action; 
that is provided in Article 1.8 The three basic routes to escape the 
necessity for a writing are retained: payment of part of the price; re-
ceipt of part of the goods; and contracts for specially manufactured 
goods. The terms of each of these exceptions have been altered. Un-
der the Code part payment or delivery and acceptance of part of the 
goods will not make the entire alleged contract enforceable; 9 it will 
be enforceable only to the extent of such payment or such receipt.10 
1\ Compare LeBel v. MCCoy, 314 Mass. 206, 49 N.E.2d 888 (1943), with Swartz v. 
Lieberman,323 Mass. 109, 80 N.E.2d 5, 12 A.L.R.2d 75 (1948). 
6 VCC §2·201. 
7 G.L., c. 106, §6, VSA §4. 
8 VCC §1-206. 
9 Black Beauty Coal Co. v. Cohen, 267 Mass. 98, 165 N.E. 878 (1929) (receipt 
of part of coal shipped sufficient evidence of transfer of possession to satisfy re-
quirements of Statute of Frauds); Technical Economist Corp. v. Moors, 255 Mass. 
591, 152 N.E. 83 (1926) (payment of $500 under sales agreement for $14,000 made 
agreement enforceable); Houghton & Dutton Co. v. Journal Engraving Co., 241 
Mass. 541, 135 N.E. 688 (1922) (delivery to bailee at buyer's direction sufficient); 
Antonacopoulos v. Arax Grocery Co., 234 Mass. 125, 125 N.E. 161 (1919) (part pay-
ment of $300 made contract for $3500 worth of rice enforceable). 
10 UCC §2-201 (3) (c). 
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This closes the door to fraudulent claims that the quantity called for 
by the oral agreement was considerably greater than that paid for or 
delivered. The provision as to specially manfactured goods is also 
altered. The special manufacture need no longer be "by the seller," 
but the exception only operates when there has been a "substantial 
beginning of their [the goods'] manufacture or commitments for their 
procurement" prior to repudiation.ll Added to these is a provision 
taking out of the requirements of the statute those cases in which a 
party against whom enforcement is sought admits, in his pleading, 
testimony, or otherwise in court, that a contract for sale was made. 
Again, such a contract is enforceable only for the quantity admitted. 
Apart from the litigation as to whether a case falls within an excep-
tion, many Statute of Fraud controversies concern the sufficiency of a 
given memorandum. The Code deals with this problem explicitly and 
the result is to enlarge somewhat the group of contracts that are en-
forceable. Under present law the memorandum must set forth the 
essential terms of the contract, including price and the time of 
delivery.12 Under the Code the memorandum must be "sufficient to 
indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties 
and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought .... " 13 
Further, the Code adds, "A writing is not insufficient because it omits 
or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not en-
forceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown 
in such writing." 14 Thus the stringency of the requirement of a state-
ment of terms is eased, since all that is necessary is that the writing 
indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties, 
that it state the quantity, and that it be signed by the party against 
whom enforcement is sought. Finally, the Code recognizes a rather 
obvious commercial standard of conduct, namely, that businessmen 
are expected to answer their mail. Between merchants one may satisfy 
the statute as against the other by sending a letter confirming a con-
tract. This must be done within a reasonable time and the writing 
must be otherwise sufficient. The recipient may avoid this consequence 
by giving written notice of objection to the contents of this writing 
within ten days of its receipt.15 
So much for the formation of the contract. When the Code departs 
from prior notions it prescribes limitations and compensates for any 
liberalization with a new and perhaps less severe restriction. In the 
problem of the firm offer, the vitality given to the naked offer is limited 
by the offeror's ability to control that offer; while in the Statute of 
11 This overrules Atlas Shoe Co. v. Rosenthal, 242 Mass. 15. 136 N.E. 107 (1922). 
which held that the exception required that the seller be the manufacturer. 
12 Clinton Mills Co. v. Saco-Lowell Shops. 3 F.2d 410 (1st Cir. 1925) (time of 
delivery); Kemensky v. Chapin, 193 Mass. 500, 79 N.E. 781 (1907) (prior to the 
Uniform Sales Act). 
13 vce §2·201 (I). 
14 Ibid. 
Hi uee §2-201 (2). 
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Fraud cases the extension of the kinds of memoranda that satisfy the 
statute and the expansion of the various exceptions to the statute are 
coupled with the new limitations relating to quantity. There are other 
such changes, but limitation of space permits only a footnote reference 
to their features.16 
§3.3. From property to contract. Much, perhaps too much, has 
been written of the Code's departure from the approach of the common 
law and of the Sales Act to those issues decided by a search for the 
title to the goods or, as the Sales Act puts it, the property in the goods.1 
It is axiomatic under present law that the legal solution to a horde of 
problems is reached through locating the property in the goods. Prob-
lems solved on this basis include the risk of loss, the right to sue for the 
purchase price, tax liability, insurability, creditors' rights, rules of 
damages, choice of law and the availability of the possessory remedies.2 
Under the Code many of these issues are no longer referred to the 
test of property in the goods. Each issue has been examined and, in 
the light of the peculiar problems involved, observable factual criteria 
based upon what is thought to be a proper policy for that problem 
have been developed. The study of the Code solution to a problem 
then requires the lawyer to identify a narrow issue, seek its specific 
solution in the Code, and only if none is offered is reference had to 
the property concept.3 For present purposes this technique can be 
illustrated by an examination of the problem of risk of loss. 
The Sales Act precisely ties risk of loss to property in the goods in the 
absence of a contrary agreement.4 However, two risk of loss problems 
were isolated under the Sales Act. Risk passes to the buyer when the 
16 Section 2·207 treats these problems of offer and acceptance when the acceptance 
contains additional or varying terms. Such terms are dealt with as proposals for 
an addition to the contract and between merchants they become part of the contract 
unless the offer expressly limits acceptance to its terms, they materially alter the 
offer, or the offeror objects within a reasonable time. 
Section 2·210 deals with assignments and is noteworthy since it gives either the 
assignor or the obligee the right to enforce the assumption promise of an assignee. 
Compare Massachusetts cases on a creditor· beneficiary's right to enforce such a 
contract, e.g., Gustafson v. Doyle, 329 Mass. 473, 109 N.E.2d 465 (1952); Prentice 
v. Brimhall, 123 Mass. 291 (1877); Mellen v. Whipple, 1 Gray 317 (Mass. 1854) . 
Section 2·302 permits the court after considering the commercial setting of the 
contract to refuse to enforce all or a part of the contract found as a matter of law 
to be unconscionable. 
§3.3. 1 Some enlightening comments will be found in Williston, The Law of 
Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 561 (1950); 
Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code - Sales; Should It Be Enacted? 59 Yale L. 
J. 821 (1950); Rabel, The Sales Law in the Proposed Commercial Code, 17 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 427 (1950). 
2 General Laws, c. 106 (the USA) specifically referred to the property concept 
for solution to problems of right to the price (G.L., c. 106, §52, USA §63), risk of 
loss (G.L., c. 106, §24, USA §22), and rules of damages (G.L., c. 106, §56, USA §67). 
3 Section 2·401 formulates criteria for determining passage of title when that 
concept is still determinative, as in questions of tax liability. 
4 G.L., c. 106, §24, USA §22. Typical cases are Cochrane v. Forbes, 257 Mass. 
135, 153 N.E. 566 (1926); Levy v. Radkay, 233 Mass. 29. 123 N.E. 97 (1919). 
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goods are delivered even though the seller retains the property in the 
goods solely as a security interest. In addition, risk of any loss resulting 
from delay in delivery falls on the party at fault.5 Under the Code 
ownership ceases to be the test and a possessor who does not own the 
goods may nonetheless bear the risk of loss. 
When there has been no breach by either party, Section 2·509 estab-
lishes criteria for the passage of the risk of loss. The parties' contractual 
power to place the risk of loss is preserved and the rules set out are 
subject to such agreement. If under the contract the seller is required 
or authorized to ship goods by carrier, risk passes upon delivery to the 
carrier unless the seller is required to deliver the goods at a particular 
destination. This is comparable to the presumption in the Uniform 
Sales Act that when the seller is to deliver the goods to a particular 
place, property in the goods does not pass until the goods reach that 
place. Special criteria are also formulated for the case in which the 
goods are in the possession of a bailee and are to be delivered without 
being moved. In the remaining cases risk of loss passes to the buyer 
upon receipt of the goods if the seller is a merchant; if he is not, risk 
passes upon tender of delivery. Here merchants retain the risk of loss 
for a longer period than non-merchants. The comments indicate that 
this is based upon the likelihood that a merchant-seller can be ex-
pected to insure goods over which he continues to have control while 
it is unlikely that a buyer will insure goods not in his possession. 
When a breach of the contract occurs and the aggrieved party is in 
control of the goods, any loss not covered by his insurance falls upon 
the contract-breaker rather than the person aggrieved. Again the 
probability of insurance coverage is used to determine which party will 
bear the risk. As to "sales on approval," Section 2-327 articulates par-
ticular rules of law governing risk of loss so that the risk remains upon 
the seller until acceptance. 
§3.4. Seller's obligation as to quality. From the time that Chief 
Justice Rugg determined that warranty was sometimes available in 
cases in which a negligence action would not lie, Massachusetts lawyers 
have been acutely aware of the utility of the warranty action. l The 
Code's approach in this area is to sharpen some of the concepts in and 
fill some of the interstices left by the Uniform Sales Act. Massachusetts 
case law is usually consistent with the results achieved. 
The former implied warranties by description and sample are classi-
fied in the Code as express warranties along with the traditional affir-
mations and promises relating to the goods.2 The rules governing such 
express warranties are comparable to those enunciated in the Uniform 
Sales Act, although the "reliance" requirement is now expressed in 
5 G.L., c. 106, §24, USA §22. 
§3.4. 1 Ash v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 86, 120 N.E. 396 (1918) (no 
recovery in negligence); Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 
407 (1918) (recovery in warranty). 
2 UCC §2-313(1)(b), (c). 
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terms of the affirmations, descriptions, or samples being a "part of the 
basis of the bargain." 3 
The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a par-
ticular purpose are retained but are expressed in somewhat different 
terms. Under the Uniform Sales Act the warranty of merchantability 
demanded a sale "by description" from "a seller who deals in goods 
of that description." 4 The cases frequently ignored the first require-
ment, and it is dropped in the Code.1! Section 2-314 expresses the latter 
requisite by imposing the liability only upon "merchants." The age-
old struggle relating to the serving of food and drink is settled in ac-
cordance with the Massachusetts cases by attaching the warranty of 
merchantability to these transactions.6 Finally, Section 2-314 sets forth 
for the first time explicit tests to determine "merchantable quality." 
Neither the Sales Act nor the Massachusetts cases articulated such ex-
press criteria. 
The warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is similarly not 
sharply altered under the Code. There is a statutory recognition of the 
fact that the courts have not insisted literally upon the terms of the 
Uniform Sales Act that the buyer must "make known" his purpose. 
Under Section 2-315 it is enough that the seller has "reason to know" 
the buyer's purpose. The major change wrought in this section is the 
omission of a provision making the warranty of fitness inapplicable to 
a sale by a patent or trade name.7 This omission is designed to make 
the sale by a patent or trade name merely one of the circumstances 
in determining whether the buyer relied on the seller's skill and 
judgment. 
Two concepts have hitherto reduced the thrust of warranty liability. 
One of these is that "privity of contract" is a prerequisite to recovery 
in warranty. Thus, under the prior law the warranty runs only to the 
actual immediate buyer.8 The Code explicitly recognizes that the 
warranty covers the personal injuries of any plaintiff who is in the 
family or household of the buyer or is a guest in his home when it is 
3 Id. §2-313(1)(a). 
4 G.L., c. 106, §17, USA §15. 
I) UCC §2-314. 
6 Schuler v. Union News Co., 295 Mass. !l50, 4 N.E.2d 465 (1936); Friend v. 
Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407 (1918). 
7 Such sales under G.L., c. 106, §17(4), USA §15(4), did not carry a warranty of 
fitness. Compare Agoos Kid Co. v. Blumenthal Import Corp., 282 Mass. I, 184 
;\I.E. 279 (1933) ("Bagdad Goatskins Drysalted" not trade name), and Ireland v. 
Louis K. Liggett Co., 243 Mass. 243, 137 N.E. 371 (1922) (warranty present when 
seller recommends item with trade name). 
8 In Colby v. First National Stores, Inc., 307 Mass. 252, 254, 29 N.E.2d 920, 921 
(1940), the rule as to married women's recovery for breach of warranty was summed 
up as follows: "A married woman buying food for her family may be in one of 
three positions: she may buy it as agent of her husband as a disclosed principal, as 
an agent for him as an undisclosed principal, or as a principal buying in her own 
behalf. If ,the position of this plaintiff in the transaction disclosed by the evidence 
was that of a principal, or that of an agent for her husband as an undisclosed 
principal, there was a contract between her and the defendant." 
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reasonable to expect such a person will come in contact with the 
goods. II On the other hand, the need for privity in suits against manu-
facturers or wholesalers by retail buyers is not affected by the Code. 
Disclaimer clauses are the second source of limitation on warranty 
liability. Section 2-316 effectuates disclaimer clauses depending upon 
the type of warranty involved. If it is an express warranty, the nega-
tion is inoperable only when the terms creating and denying the war-
ranty cannot reasonably be construed as consistent with each other. 
All implied warranties may be excluded by use of the term "as is," 
"with all faults," or the like; by inspection prior to entering into the 
contract; or by a course of dealing, course of performance or usage of 
the trade. Otherwise, the implied warranties of fitness and mer-
chantability can only be excluded by complying with requirements 
adequately designed to warn the buyer of the disclaimer. Furthermore, 
the parol evidence rule will no longer operate as a hidden disclaimer 
of the warranty of merchantability or fitness. 1O 
§3.5. Rights of third parties. Some of the most vexing problems in 
commercial law involve the ability of third parties to upset the relation-
ship established in an outstanding transaction. In the sales area such 
questions involve creditors of, and purchases from, both the seller and 
the buyer. 
Under the Uniform Sales Act the seller's retention of possession of 
sold goods ran to the benefit of both his creditors and subsequent 
vendees. The Sales Act left entirely to local law the question of such 
retention of possession being a fraud on creditors.1 Thus in Massa-
chusetts a creditor of the seller attaching such goods would take an 
interest superior to the first buyer's claim.2 Section 2-402 (2) of the Code 
initially makes a similar reference to local law to determine the issue; 
but the same section protects the first buyer when the retention of 
possession is "in good faith and current course of trade by a merchant-
seller for a commercially reasonable time." The innocent buyer from 
the seller in possession was protected under the prior law if he paid 
value and took possession prior to learning of the first buyer's interest 
in the goods.s Section 2-403 (2) limits such protection to cases in which 
the subsequent purchaser qualifies as a "buyer in ordinary course of 
business" and purchases from a merchant-seller. Section 1-201 (9) de-
fines "buyer in ordinary course of business" and is worthy of careful 
9 UCC §2-318. 
10 Compare UCC §2-316 (2) with Dekofski v. Leite, 1957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 849, 142 
N.E.2d 782, and S. F. Bowser & Co. v. Independent Dye House, Inc., 276 Mass. 289, 
177 N.E. 268 (1931). 
§3.5. 1 G.L., c. 106, §28, USA §26. 
2 The cases prior to the Uniform Sales Act indicate this result. Hallgarten v. 
Oldham, 135 Mass. I, 46 Am. Rep. 433 (1883); Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass. 1l0, 
9 Am. Dec. 119 (1821). 
3 G.L., c. 106, §27, USA § 25. See, e.g., Tripp v. National Shawmut Bank of 
Boston, 263 Mass 505,161 N.E. 904 (1928). 
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attention, since the concept pervades the whole Code. For present 
purposes it is enough to note that this definition does not specify that 
the second buyer must take possession prior to learning of the first 
buyer's claim, and that persons taking transfers as security for a money 
debt are excluded from the term. These limitations should be kept in 
mind when one is evaluating the broad effect of Section 2-403 (2) in 
protecting such a buyer in ordinary course as against anyone who en-
trusts possession to a merchant seller with or without authority to selL 
-Subsequent innocent purchasers may also deal with the first buyer 
when the seller has the power to avoid the original transfer. The most 
frequent example of such a case occurs when the first buyer acquired 
the goods by fraud. In such cases the Uniform Sales Act stated that 
the subsequent purchaser was to be protected as against the seller.4 
Section 2-403 (1) continues this concept. The examples given in that 
section enlarge the protection given to the second purchaser since the 
second buyer is protected when his vendor' acquires his interest in a 
"cash sale." 5 Thus the second buyer qualifies for protection if he is 
a "good faith purchaser for value." A reference to definitions in Sec-
tions 1-201 (19) (good faith), 1-201 (33) (purchaser), and 1-201 (44) 
(value) puts considerable content into those terms. Under the Code 
subsequent transferees taking a security interest for a money debt will 
be protected. Thus the term is much broader than the previously dis-
cussed "buyer in ordinary course." 
One other provision particularly needs to be considered in connec-
tion with the rights of third parties. Under the prior law the otherwise 
legitimate device of consignment could mislead both purchasers from, 
and creditors of, the consignee. Subsequent buyers were protected by 
the Factor's Act.6 But creditors could be misled by the apparent owner-
ship of the consignee. When the device is used to create a security in-
terest the requirement of filing under the provisions of Article 9, 
Chattel Security, will operate to alleviate this danger.7 But when the 
consignment is utilized entirely as a tool for effectuating an agency for 
sale relationship, Section 2-326 extends a protection to creditors similar 
to that given to bona fide purchasers under the Factors Act. Limita-
tions on this protection are created 'when the possessor of the goods for 
sale "is generally known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in 
selling the goods of others," and when the person delivering the goods 
puts the creditors on notice by filing under Article 9. 
§3.6. Remedies. The most significant alterations in the structure 
of the remedial rights of parties to the sales transaction are the broad-
4 G.L., c. 106, §26, USA §24. 
5 Compare UCC §2-403 (1) with Casey v. Gallagher, 326 Mass. 746, 96 N.E.2d 
709 (1951) (evidence warranted finding of no "cash sale" and bona fide purchaser 
could be protected). 
6 General Laws, c. 104, §1 protects such buyers if the consignee had authority 
to sell. 
i Code §§1-201 (37) and 9-102(2) make the consignment intended as a security 
device subject to Article 9. 
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ening of the buyer's right to replevin and the introduction of the 
concept of the seller's power to "cure" and the buyer's power to 
"cover." 
Replevin is available in a new situation under Section 2-502 which 
permits the buyer who has a special property, and has paid a part or 
all of the price, to recover goods upon tendering any unpaid portion of 
the price if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt 
of the first installment on the price.! Furthermore, Section 2-716 ex-
pands the remedy by abandoning the rule that the right to replevin 
depends upon the passage of title.2 On the other hand that same sec-
tion may limit the remedy since if substitute goods are available there 
is no right to recover the goods. This is the notion of "cover." Under 
Section 2-712, the buyer is permitted to "cover" and thus fix his dam-
ages by "making in good faith and without unreasonable delay any 
reasonable purchase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution 
for those due from the seller." It should be noted that the buyer may 
cover or rely entirely upon the market price in ascertaining his 
damages. The concept of "cure" is also new. Under Section 2-508, if 
time for performance has not yet expired, the seller has the power of 
correcting any non-conforming delivery after notifying the buyer of 
that election. This has a mitigating effect upon Section 2-601 which 
provides for rejection by the buyer "if the goods or the tender of 
delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract." 
§3.6. 1 Compare the seller's corresponding right upon the buyer's insolvency 
in UCC §2-702. 
2 G.L., c. 106, §55, USA §66. 
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